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Abstract
The aim of this research was to examine the underlying cognitive processes as
well as the physiological outcomes of disclosing traumatic events. Epstein (1973, 1991,
1994, 1998) has argued the existence of two fundamental modes of cognitive processing:
a rational mode that involves higher brain functioning and is reason-oriented, and an
experiential mode that involves lower brain functioning and is pleasure-pain oriented.
We examined the hypothesis that fact-based disclosure invokes rational processing while
emotion-based disclosure invokes experiential processing by examining participants'
physiological reactivity during as well as their behavior in a decision-making task
following written disclosure. Based on previous findings suggesting that events
involving high vs. low brain functioning involve different types of physiological
activation (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991), I proposed the following: First,
emotion-based retelling would result in a uniform pattern of autonomic activity across
subjects, marked by an increase in sympathetic (SNS) activity coupled with a decrease iIi
parasympathetic (PNS) activity. Conversely, fact-based retelling would result in diverse
SNS and PNS activity between subjects, including an increase in SNS activity with no
change in PNS activity, and a decrease in PNS activity with no change in SNS activity.
Second, emotion-based retelling would result in more nonoptimal than optimal choices in
the decision-making task, while fact-based retelling would result in more optimal than
nonoptimal choices in the task. Sixty undergraduates at a private, liberal arts university
wrote about either a personally traumatic life event or a trivial topic for ten minutes and
then participated in a decision-making task modeled after Epstein's ratio-bias (RB)
paradigm. Impedance cardiography and a blood pressure cuffwere employed to examine
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autonomic arousal, such as heart rate (HR) , blood pressure (BP), respiratory sinus
arrhythmia (RSA), and pre-ejection period (PEP) throughout the study. In partial support
of our hypotheses, results indicated a significant degree of coupling between the PNS and
SNS for those participants who wrote only about the emotions surrounding their trauma.
Significant differences in the RB paradigm were found only in trial! of the task, with
those writing about both the facts and emotions surrounding their trauma and those
writing about trivial topics making the most optimal choices. Although these findings are
promising rather than definitive, they suggest that the type of writing regarding a
traumatic event invokes different cognitive and physiological processes.
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Cognitive and Physiological Processes Underlying Written Disclosure
"I think of writing as a battle between my consciousness and my
subconscious...that's my escape" O'Jikida's response, Magee, 1999). This was one
participant's response in a study that examined the role of written disclosure among
female adolescents (Magee, 1999). In addition to serving as an escape, Magee (1999)
found that young adults disclose traumatic events for a variety of reasons: To identify
emotions, reflect upon the experience, and release sentiments of pain and anger.
Research indicates that the outcomes accompanying disclosure of traumatic events
surpass psychological benefits alone (Petronio, 2000; Pennebaker, 1995; Pennebaker,
Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). More specifically, emotional
disclosure of traumatic events has been associated with short-term cardiovascular
reactivity as well as long-term physical benefits, such as improved immune functioning
and fewer visits to the health center (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 1995;
Petronio, 2000). For example, Pennebaker & Beall (1986) examined the physiological
outcomes related to fact-based versus emotion-based disclosure of a traumatic event. All
participants wrote about a personally traumatic event for fifteen minutes on four
consecutive days. Those in the emotion-based group were asked to write about the
feelings surrounding a personal trauma, while those in the fact-based group were asked to
describe a personal trauma in a narrative fashion without referring to any personal
feelings. Results indicated that those who wrote about the emotions surrounding a
traumatic event displayed temporary increases in blood pressure as well as reductions in
illness in the six months following the study as compared to those who wrote about the
facts surrounding a traumatic experience. (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986).
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The aim of the current study is to examine how disclosure fits into a larger model
of cognitive processing. One model of cognitive processing is contained within Epstein's
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) (Epstein 1973; 1991; 1994; 1998). CEST
asserts that humans rely upon two distinct yet parallel information processors, rational
and experiential, to make sense of the world. The rational mode involves higher brain
functioning and is driven by reason and deliberative thought, whereas the experiential
mode involves lower brain functioning and is driven by affect (the pleasure-pain
principle) and heuristics (Epstein, 1994). This study tested the proposition that disclosure
is a function of experiential processing by examining the behavioral and physiological
outcomes of written disclosure.
Experiential versus Rational Processing
Epstein's Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (1973) is a global theory of
personality that proposes the existence of two parallel, interactive systems through which
people understand and adapt to the world: A rational system and an experiential system.
While all behavior and conscious thought are believed to result from the joint function of
the two information processing systems, certain experiences more heavily engage one
system over another (Epstein, 1994). The degree of dominance of each system is
influenced by various factors, such as the nature of the event, individual differences in
styles of thinking, and the degree of emotional involvement (Epstein, 1994). For
example, emotional arousal and relevant experience are believed to increase relative
engagement of the experiential system, while solving mathematics problems is believed
to increase relative engagement ofthe rational system. While the two systems normally
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collaborate in a seamless and interactive manner, they sometimes conflict. This conflict
is experienced as a struggle between thoughts and feelings.
According to CEST (Epstein, 1994, 1998), the experiential system represents
lower brain functioning and is a highly adaptive system that has evolved in human-like
ancestors for over seven million years. It operates similarly in humans and nonhumans
yet is more complex in humans, who have a more highly developed cerebral cortex and
can use language. At its lower levels of operation, it is a crude system that automatically,
rapidly, effortlessly, and efficiently processes infonnation. The experiential system is
experienced passively and relies primarily upon cognitive heuristics in detennining
thoughts and behavior. It is the human "default" option of the brain, resisting change and
often functioning according to broad generalizations and the pleasure-pain principle (i.e.,
what feels good). Moreover, a fundamental distinction between the rational and
experiential systems lies in the fact that the experiential system is intimately associated
with affect and experience and the rational system with logic and reason.
The rational system is an evolutionarily newer system that dates back
approximately 5,000 years and involves higher brain functioning (Epstein, 1998). It
encodes reality in symbols, codes, and numbers and operates primarily in the medium of
language. Because the use of written symbols, signs, and numbers is estimated to be less
than 5,000 years old, the rational system is believed to be evolutionarily newer than the
experiential system (Epstein, 1998). The rational system is a deliberative, effortful,
abstract system that is experienced actively and consciously (Epstein, 1998). In contrast
to the experiential system, the rational system is capable of high levels of abstraction and
long-tenn delay of gratification. Furthennore, it is analytical, logical, and driven
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primarily by reason and higher-order thinking. A detailed comparison of the rational and
experiential systems can be viewed in Table 1 (Epstein, 1994, 1998).
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Behavior
As previously stated, Epstein proposes that all behavior typically results from a
parallel, interactive collaboration of the experiential and rational systems (Epstein, 1998).
The relative contribution of each mode varies from none at all to complete dominance
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Under most circumstances, both systems operate
synchronously, giving the appearance of a single process in function. Emotional
involvement and relevant past experiences, however, shift the balance of influence in the
direction of the experiential system (Epstein, 1998). Furthermore, certain conditions,
such as individual differences in thinking styles and situational variables, result in a
conflict between the two modes, distinguishing the qualities of one mode over the other
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
While both systems are typically involved in determining behavior, Epstein
asserts that the automatic processing of the experiential system is dominant over the
rational system (Epstein, 1994). It is the effortless, efficient, more compelling "default"
option of the brain that precedes and significantly influences the rational system (Epstein,
1994). Moreover, because the experiential system is intimately associated with affect, it
is likely to be experienced as more compelling and passionate than logical thinking.
Finally, because the influence of the experiential system is usually outside of awareness,
it is not controlled by the rational system, as the individual is not aware that there is
anything to control (Epstein, 1998).
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Because the experiential system is driven by the pleasure-pain principle,
dominance of the experiential system over the rational system often occurs in the
presence of emotionally stimulating experiences. For example, when a person responds
to an emotionally stimulating event, the following sequence of actions is believed to
occur: The experiential system automatically searches its memory for related experiences
and their "emotional accompaniments" (Epstein, 1994). Next, the recalled feelings result
in further processing and reactions, which in subhuman animals are actions and in
humans are conscious and unconscious thoughts and behaviors. If the related
experiences stored in the memory bank are positive, then actions intended to reproduce
the feelings are initiated. If the related stored experiences are negative, then actions are
initiated in attempts to avoid the negative feelings (Epstein, 1994). Epstein asserts that in
such emotionally stimulating events, the engagement of the rational system is minimal to
none (Epstein, 1998). Consequently, this may be why individuals often respond in
irrational, passionate, impulsive ways to experiences that are close to their hearts.
Historical and Research Support for the Existence of Two Cognitive Systems
Epstein (1994) claims that research from a variety of disciplines supports the
existence of two fundamentally distinct cognitive systems. Historically, the earliest
support for two cognitive systems dates back to Socrates, who, in Plato's Republic,
recognized and discussed a conflict between desire and reason that is analogous to the
conflict between the experiential and rational systems. In the realm of psychology, the
most influential division of the mind has been Freud's psychoanalytic distinction between
primary and secondary processes. Freud posited a distinction between the id, or the
human unconscious that functions according to primary processes (the pleasure
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principle), and the ego, the human consciousness that functions according to secondary
processes (the reality principle). A variety of other psychologists have also suggested a
distinction between two types of information-processors. For example, Pavlov (as cited
in Epstein, 1994) proposed a distinction between a first and second signaling system, the
former including nonverbal conditioning and the latter verbally mediated processes.
Similarly, Labouvie-Vief(1989, 1990) distinguished between logos, a rational, analytical
mode of information processing, and mythos, and intuitive, holistic mode (as cited in
Epstein, 1994). Social psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1983) introduced the
concept of heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, to conclude that there were two common
forms of reasoning-a natural, intuitive mode and an extensional, logical mode.
Furthermore, Bargh (1989), Higgins (1989), and Swann (Swann, 1984; Swann, Hixon,
Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990) demonstrated the existence of an automatic,
preconscious processing that operates according to different rules than deliberative,
conscious processing (as cited in Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein claims that the distinction
between two fundamentally different modes of processing has been posited by a variety
of researchers dating back to Socrates and Freud.
Everyday Behaviors as Support for Two Cognitive Systems
In addition to historical and research support, Epstein cites a variety of everyday
human behaviors as support for the existence of a rational and experiential mode of
processing (Epstein, 1973, 1994). Epstein points to the influence of emotions upon
thinking as a prime illustration. For example, when experiencing intense emotions, many
have heard the advice, "Get a grip on yourself, you're too emotional to think straight."
According to Epstein, such advice illustrates that people are intrinsically aware of two
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different modes of information processing, one that is emotionally driven and one that is
rationally driven (Epstein, 1994).
Similarly, Epstein asserts that the influence of thinking upon emotions people's
emotions also supports the distinction between the rational and experiential systems.
According to him, people's emotions are a result oftheir interpretation of an event as
opposed to the event itself (Epstein, 1994). For example, if a person interprets an action
directed at him or her as unwarranted and deserving of punishment, the person will most
likely feel angry. On the other hand, if the same action is interpreted as a serious threat to
life from which escape is the desired response, the person will more likely feel frightened
(e.g., Avail, 1980; Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1973; Epstein, 1984; Lazarus, 1982, as cited in
Epstein, 1994). The preconscious processes that result in human evaluation and
interpretation of daily events occur rapidly and automatically and precede the
deliberative, linear, analytical thinking that is characteristic of the rational system
(Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein asserts that such automatic, preconscious thinking
suggests an information processing system that operates by different principles as
compared to a deliberative, analytical method of thought.
Furthermore, Epstein points to the difference between insight and intellectual
knowledge as further support for two cognitive systems. For example, researchers have
shown that deriving knowledge experientially (via experience) is often more compelling
and more likely to influence behavior than abstract knowledge (Brewin, 1989; Fazio &
Zanna, 1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977 as cited in Epstein, 1994). Information gained
through personally meaningful experience has been shown to be more effective in
changing feelings and behavior than information acquired through textbooks or lectures
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(Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein asserts that the observation that there are two different
types of knowledge, intellectual and insightful, parallels the idea that there are two kinds
of information processors, analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential (Epstein, 1994).
Moreover, Epstein points to human beliefs such as irrational fears as further
support for the existence of two modes of processing. First, irrational fears provide an
automatic, illogical way of processing information (Epstein, 1994). People often
acknowledge that such fears are irrational yet still maintain them. For example, those
who make great efforts to drive everywhere in an attempt to avoid flying realize that
statistically speaking, their fear is irrational. They are at greater risk of harm when
driving as opposed to flying, yet they feel safer in a situation that they know intellectually
to be more dangerous. According to Epstein, such an acknowledged discrepancy
provides support for the existence of two different modes of processing.
In addition, Epstein claims that superstitious thinking supports the idea that
humans' thoughts do not rely solely upon an intellectual, rational system. A recent
Gallup poll surveyed 1,236 adults to find that one in four reported believing in ghosts,
one in six said reported communicating with someone deceased, one in four reported
communicating telepathically with someone, and one in seven believed they had seen a
UFO (Epstein, 1994). Such data illustrate that irrational thinking is common and that
beliefs are not composed solely of factual or rational information.
Empirical Research on Heuristic Processing in Support of Cognitive-Experiential Self
Theory
In addition to everyday behaviors, Epstein uses a variety of research on heuristic
based processing as further support for CEST. Heuristic processing refers to the use of
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cognitive shortcuts for making decisions under situations of uncertainty. Heuristic
processing can but does not necessarily occur under emotionally stimulating
circumstances (Epstein, 1991). Much of the work on heuristic processing is based upon
work done by Tversky and Kahneman (1974; 1983) which demonstrates that people often
think in heuristic ways that are automatic, rapid, and efficient yet sometimes produce
errors when judged against logical standards (Epstein, 1991). A series of studies
conducted by Sloat (1992) and Epstein et al. (1992; 1993; 1994; 1999) found that
individuals engaged in a variety of heuristic-based processing, as demonstrated by
arbitrary-outcome-oriented processing, sequential processing, and the ratio-bias
phenomenon. According to Epstein and his colleagues (1994), such heuristic-based
processing further supports the existence of a rational and experiential information
processor as proposed by CEST.
Arbitrary-outcome-oriented processing. Epstein et al. (1992) modeled this study
after a study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). In the original Tversky and
Kahneman (1983) study, participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which two
individuals arrive at the airport thirty minutes after their scheduled departure time. One
individual realizes that her flight left on time, while the other learns that, due to a delay,
her flight just left a few minutes ago. Despite the fact that from a logical perspective, the
differences in the two situations should not matter, participants consistently reported that
they would be more upset in the latter condition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Epstein suggests that this behavior supports the existence of two different modes
of processing. As illustrated, emotion-provoking stimuli, such as imagining that one has
missed his/her flight, caused people to consciously disregard reason and rely solely upon
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automatic, irrational, experiential processing. According to Epstein, these results also
support the idea that the experiential system is associationistic; in other words, the
experiential system connects events by similarity and proximity as opposed to an
understanding of causality. This was demonstrated by the effect that heuristic, or
experiential, processing had upon the rational system. As evidenced in the Tversky and
Kahneman study (1983), heuristic processing led people to judge events that were
arbitrarily related as causally related.
Sequential processing. To support the claim that the experiential system is a
rapid, automatic information processor that precedes the functioning of the rational
system, Epstein and colleagues (1993) asked participants to respond to vignettes that
described random unfortunate outcomes by writing the first three thoughts that came to
mind (Epstein, 1993). For example, one vignette asked participants to put themselves in
the place of a protagonist who had an accident when backing his automobile from a space
in which his friend had asked him to park. Participants reported that their first emotion
was one of anger: "It's his fault. Except for him, I wouldn't have had the accident." By
their third thought, however, their thinking was more rational, accepting the
responsibility as their own and reporting feelings of guilt as opposed to anger (Epstein,
1993). Consistent with CEST, participants' initial, automatic thought was one of intense
emotion associated with the functioning of the experiential system. Upon reflection,
however, their thoughts were more consistent with the operation of the rational system,
supporting the assumption that the experiential system is a rapid, automatic system that
precedes the operation of the more reflective, deliberative rational system (Epstein,
1993).

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

14

The ratio-bias phenomenon. The ratio-bias phenomenon, according to Epstein,
serves as the most compelling evidence in support of the existence of two distinct modes
of processing. This phenomenon becomes evident in the presence of an experimental
procedure designed to set the experiential and rational modes in conflict with each other
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Epstein calls this test of the ratio-bias phenomenon the
ratio-bias task. The ratio-bias (RB) phenomenon occurs when participants assess a lower
probability event as being more likely than a higher probability event when the lower
probability is presented as a ratio of larger numbers (Le., lOin 100) and the higher
probability event is given in smaller numbers (e.g., 1 in 10) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
This phenomenon first became evident through a series of studies conducted by
Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989, as cited in Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). These
studies showed that people judge the same probability of an unlikely event as lower when
the probability is presented in the form of a ratio of smaller rather than of larger numbers.
For example, results indicated that participants believed that a mother would be more
suspicious that her child had cheated (by peeking) ifhe succeeded in drawing a desired
chocolate chip cookie from a jar that contained 1 chocolate chip cookie of 20 cookies,
than ifhe drew the desired cookie from a jar that contained 10 chocolate chip cookies of
200 cookies (Miller et aI., 1989, as cited in Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). In other words,
drawing the one desired cookie from a jar of twenty cookies was considered to be less
likely, and therefore it aroused greater suspicion than drawing one of the 10 desired
cookies in a jar containing 190 other cookies (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
According to Kirkpatrick & Epstein (1992), the ratio-bias effect can be explained
by two principal attributes of the experiential system: the concretive principle and the
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experiential learning principle. According to the concretive principle, people primarily
encode information in the experiential system in the form of concrete representations
(such as absolute numbers) as opposed to abstract representations (such as the relations
between numbers). Thus, because absolute numbers are more concrete than ratios,
people should generally be more influenced by absolute numbers. Moreover, ratios
between large numbers often seem experientially less extreme than rations between small
numbers. This is also attributed to the concretive principle; because large numbers of
items are less pronounced in memory (i.e. are less concrete) than small numbers, "they
are more likely to be perceived as closer to a ratio of equal quantities" (Kirkpatrick &
Epstein, 1992). This follows partly from the fact that people can keep approximately
seven pieces of information in their short-term memory. Therefore, people can more
accurately represent one versus ten items in memory than ten versus one hundred items
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999).
Furthermore, according to the experiential learning principle, the schemata that
exist in the experiential system represent generalizations from emotionally significant
experiences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Consequently, through emotionally
significant experiences in their lives, individuals are likely to have learned that any event
with a l-in-20 or l-in-any-large-number is unlikely to occur. In other words, people have
come to learn that the phrase "1 in x odds" is understood to mean ''unlikely.'' For this
reason, CEST asserts that the subjective probability of a l-in-l0 outcome is smaller than
a 1O-in-l 00 outcome. Thus, when combined, the concretive and experiential learning
principles assert that "an unusual event with a given objective probability of occurrence
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will have a higher subjective probability when it is represented by larger than by smaller
absolute numbers" (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
Based on these principles, Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) hypothesized that the
experiential system would be more responsive to absolute numbers than to ratios,
whereas the rational system would exhibit the reverse pattern. To test this hypothesis, the
Miller et al. (1989) paradigm was modified to make it a suitable for study in the
laboratory as a real experience: Participants were given the opportunity to win money by
drawing a red jelly bean from one of two bowls, a small bowl that contained 1 in 10 red
jelly beans, and a large bowl that contained lOin 100 red jelly beans. Participants were
told that in order to be able to select the bowl from which they wanted to draw, they
would have to pay a dime for every trial; otherwise, the bowl from which they selected
would be determined randomly. Although both bowls yielded a 10% of drawing a red
jelly bean, participants tended to prefer the large bowl as compared to the small bowl
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Moreover, a considerable proportion of participants paid
dimes in order to have the privilege of choosing the large bowl over the small one
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Participants acknowledged that they felt irrational and
foolish in paying to draw from the larger bowl, but they felt that they had a better chance
of drawing a red jelly bean when there were more of them (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
In a subsequent form of the study in which subjects were presented with a
vignette of the jelly bean paradigm without the opportunity to win money, the majority of
participants reported that they did not have a preference between the two bowls and
would not pay extra money to be able to select the bowl from which they chose
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). When asked to guess how others would respond,
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however, participants reported that most people would prefer to draw from the larger
bowl (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
The ratio-bias phenomenon has also been replicated in extreme versions of the
ratio-bias paradigm in which the probabilities between the large and the small bowls are
different. In two experiments (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994), participants preferred to
choose from the large bowl that promised a 9% chance of winning as compared to the
small bowl that promised a 10% chance of winning. A minority of participants (20%
30%) even chose to draw from the large bowl even when they knew it offered a 5%
chance of winning as compared to the small bowl which offered a 10% chance of
winning (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Among those who made nonoptimal choices,
many acknowledged a conflict between emotion and reason and recognized that they had
acted irrationally (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). These results demonstrate the dominance
of the experiential system over the rational system in a simple task in which the two
systems were placed in conflict with each other. Under these circumstances, the majority
of participants found their intuitive (experiential) judgments to be more compelling,
despite their explicit recognition that their behavior was irrational (Denes-Raj & Epstein,
1994).
Epstein cites the results obtained from the ratio-bias paradigms as support for a
variety of CEST assumptions. First, Epstein asserts that the conflict produced by the RB
paradigm was due to a conflict between the rational and experiential systems. A majority
of participants were initially attracted (in their experiential system) to the large bowl
because it contained more winning beans and later recognized (in their rational system)
that it made no difference from which bowl they chose. Despite this realization, the
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decision invoked by the automatic, change-resistant experiential system dominated the
participant's behavior in many cases. Second, the results of the ratio-bias paradigms
support the Kirkpatrick and Epstein hypothesis (1992) that the experiential system is
more responsive to concrete as compared to abstract representations. Third, the fact that
participants expressed no preference to either tray when the opportunity to win money
was revoked demonstrates that individuals have the need to appear rational; in the
emotionally-stimulating trial, however, in which money was a factor, participants readily
relied upon their experiential system. This supports the assertion that the experiential
system is more heavily engaged in the presence of emotional stimuli (Kirkpatrick &
Epstein, 1992). Moreover, results indicate that in order to demonstrate the ratio-bias
phenomenon, it is necessary to "either bypass the rational system by using indirect
techniques (such as having subjects estimate the behavior of others) or to strongly engage
the experiential system by providing significant rewards" (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
Lastly, the extreme versions of the ratio-bias paradigm (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994)
illustrate that the experiential system can override the rational system even when
individuals acknowledge their irrationality (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
Summary of CEST
In summary, Epstein's CEST model asserts that all beings employ two distinct
modes of information processing to make sense of the world. The experiential system is
the evolutionarily older cognitive system and represents crude, lower brain functioning.
It is experienced automatically, resistant to change, and driven by heuristics and the

pleasure-pain principle. The rational system, on the other hand, is the evolutionarily new
system and represents abstract, higher brain functioning. It is experienced intentionally,

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

19

changes more rapidly, and is driven by reason. A variety of research as well as everyday
behaviors support the general distinction between two evolutionarily distinct cognitive
systems. More specifically, however, a variety of studies conducted by Epstein and
others (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Miller et aI., 1989; Epstein et aI., 1992; Epstein et
aI., 1993; Epstein, 1994; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994) demonstrate that individuals
engage in different types of heuristic-based processing. These results support the
distinction between a rational and experiential mode of processing as proposed by CEST.
In an attempt to fit disclosure into Epstein's CEST model, this study examined the
cognitive and physiological processes that underlie written disclosure. To do so,
however, it is necessary to examine prior research that examines the physiological effects
of disclosure.
Disclosure
A variety of studies indicate that disclosure of traumatic events is associated with
temporary increase in cardiovascular reactivity as well as long-term health benefits
(Pennebaker, 1995). Many of the studies examining expression of emotions and health
benefits utilize a writing paradigm developed by Pennebaker and associates, in which
subjects are randomly assigned to write about emotional or control topics over a 4-day
period for fifteen minutes a day in the laboratory (Pennebaker, 1995). Pennebaker and
Beall (1986) used this paradigm to examine the physiological consequences of writing
across four conditions: trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, trauma-combination, and control.
The trauma-fact condition was asked to describe an upsetting personal experience in a
narrative fashion, being careful to focus on the event itself and not on the feelings
surrounding the event. The trauma-emotion condition was instructed to write specifically
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about their feelings regarding a personally upsetting experience without mentioning what
had actually happened. The trauma-combination condition was asked to describe the
facts as well as the emotions surrounding a personally traumatic experience. The control
condition was asked to write about a different trivial topic each evening (a description of
their living room during the first session, the shoes they were wearing for the second
session, and a tree and the room they were sitting in for the third and forth sessions,
respectively). Health center records, physiological measures and self-reported moods and
symptoms were collected during the study.
Results indicated that writing about earlier traumatic experiences was associated
with both short-term increases in physiological arousal (increased heart rate and blood
pressure) and long-term decreases in health problems (as measured by the number of
reported illnesses and the number of visits made to health services in the 6 months
following the experiment). These effects were most pronounced among subjects who
wrote about both the trauma and their emotions associated with the trauma. Of the 127
trauma essays, 27% dealt with the death of a close friend, family member, or pet; 20%
involved boyfriend/girlfriend problems; and 16% discussed fights among or with parents
and friends. Other traumatic topics included major failure, public humiliation, car
accidents and health problems. On the other hand, participants who wrote only about the
facts surrounding a traumatic event without referring to their own emotions were similar
to the control subjects on most physiological, health, and self-report measures. These
two conditions reported more health problems in the 6 months following the experiment
as compared to the trauma-emotion and trauma-combination participants. The results of
this study provide further support for the idea that disclosure, particularly emotion-based
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disclosure of traumatic events, is associated with short-term increases in physiological
reactivity and long-term health benefits.
Disclosure and long-term health benefits. That emotion-based disclosure is
associated with improved long-term physiological outcomes is also supported by a
variety of other studies. For example, researchers have discovered that writing about
traumatic experiences is linked to improved immune functioning, decreased numbers of
physician visits for illness, and improved performance at school and work (e.g., Esterling,
Antoni, Fletcher, Margulies, & Schneiderman, 1994, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995).
Similarly, other studies indicate that failure to talk or acknowledge significant
experiences is associated with increased health problems, autonomic activity, and
ruminations (Pennebaker, 1995; Wegner, 1994, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995).
For example, across several surveys, college students and adults who reported
experiencing some type of traumatic event (e.g., sexual or physical abuse, death or
divorce of parents) were more likely to report current health problems ifthey had not
disclosed the trauma to others than ifthey had shared it (Pennebaker & Hoover, 1986;
Susman, 1986, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995). These results were obtained independent
of measures of social support (Pennebaker & Hoover, 1986). Similarly, a survey of
spouses of suicide and accidental-death victims revealed that those individuals most
likely to become ill in the year following the death were ones who had not confided in
others about their experiences (Pennebaker & O'Heeron, 1984).
Other researchers have also shown that inhibition, or a reduction in the ability to
disclose stressful events, may be linked to an increased likelihood of illness. For
example, the use of a repressive coping style has most frequently been associated with
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the onset or progression of cancer (Gross, 1989). In addition, a number of investigations
have found an association between repressive personality styles and poor natural killer
cell (NKC) activity, the most readily measurable element of immune function with
relevance to the control of tumors (Levy, Herberman, Maluish, Schlien, & Lippman,
1985).
Conversely, the expression of emotions in the laboratory, particularly negative
emotions, has been associated with improved immune functioning, namely transient
changes in blood lymphocyte reactivity to mitogens (Knapp et aI., 1992; Zakowski,
McAllister, Deal, & Baum, 1992, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995) and with small elevations
in natural killer cell (NKC) activity (Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, Polonsky, & Fahey,
1992, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995).
Disclosure and short-term physiological arousal. The finding by Pennebaker and
others (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker & O'Heeron, 1984; Pennebaker, 1995
Petronio, 2000) that cardiovascular arousal increases during and immediately after
emotion-based self-disclosure has also been validated in other studies. For example, a
study that asked participants to verbally disclose an extremely stressful events that had
happened in their lives indicated that those classified as high disclosers displayed
increased systolic and diastolic blood pressure as well as increased heart rate during
disclosing as compared to low disclosers (Pennebaker, Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987). In
addition, Cumes (1983) found that heart rate and blood pressure of participants increased
when answering the question, "What makes you angry" as compared to "What did you do
today" (as cited in Petronio, 2000). These findings contribute to the evidence that
disclosure of emotional events results in temporary increases in cardiovascular reactivity.
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Sympathetic versus parasympathetic control of the heart. While the
studies described above rely upon increases in heart rate and blood pressure as evidence
for increased cardiovascular reactivity during and following disclosure, these measures
alone cannot indicate the activity of the two divisions of the autonomic system, the
parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS).
Recent research indicates that these two divisions can co-vary reciprocally,
independently, or nonreciprocally (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993). For example,
an increase in heart rate may arise from a decrease in parasympathetic (vagal) control, an
increase in sympathetic expenditure, or a co-activation of both autonomic divisions
(Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991; Quigley & Berntson, 1990, as cited in Berntson
et aI., 1993). Moreover, studies have found that stimuli that invoke low brain
functioning, such as cold pressor tasks, result in different patterns of cardiovascular
reactivity than stimuli that invoke high brain functioning, such as mental arithmetic tasks
(Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey & Leitten, 1993). These findings suggest that events
involving high brain functioning involve one type of activation whereas lower brain
functioning involves another. More specifically, when applying this proposition to
Epstein's CEST model, it should follow that events primarily invoking the experiential
system (lower brain functioning) should result in different patterns of sympathetic and
vagal activity than those events primarily invoking the rational system (higher brain
functioning).
Respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) has been demonstrated to serve as an
indicator of vagal control of the heart (Berntson et aI., 1993). Berntson et al (1993)
define RSA as a "rhythmical fluctuation in heart periods at the respiratory frequency that
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is characterized by a shortening and lengthening of heart periods in a phase relationship
with inspiration and expiration." In other words, RSA is an alteration in the rhythm of
heartbeat in either time or force related to breathing. RSA has shown a high degree of
sensitivity to psychological and behavioral variables, thus increasing its use as an
indicator of vagal control of the heart. For example, cognitive stressors such as mental
arithmetic tasks have been shown to increase heart rate and decrease RSA (Berntson et

aI., 1993).
In contrast to RSA, pre-ejection period (PEP) has been demonstrated to serve as
an indicator of sympathetic control of the heart (Sherwood, 1993). Few studies have
examined PEP when investigating the relationship between cardiovascular reactivity and
disclosure; instead, most studies have examined other factors, such as heart rate, stroke
volume, cardiac output, and finger temperature (Richards & Gross, 1999). PEP is a
measure of isovolumic contraction time, which is the time during which the left ventricle
of the heart contracts before ejecting blood into the aorta (Sherwood, 1993). Thus, PEP'
is a measure of contractility, or how hard the heart is beating. For this reason, an inverse
relationship exists between contractility and PEP: As contractility increases, PEP
becomes shorter and vice-versa (Sherwood, 1993). How hard the heart beats (as opposed
to how fast) is a function solely of sympathetic nervous system activity. Therefore, in
examining autonomic reactivity in this study, we used PEP and RSA as indicators of
sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, respectively.
Based on past research examining Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, disclosure,
and physiological reactivity, I used Pennebaker & Beall's writing paradigm (1987) to
examine whether emotional and rational disclosure respectively invoked experiential and
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rational processes, respectively. I hypothesized that the trauma-fact and trauma-emotion
writing conditions would invoke two different modes of processing: Participants
disclosing the facts surrounding their trauma were expected to invoke their rational mode
of processing, while those disclosing the emotions surrounding their trauma were
expected to invoke their experiential system. I tested this hypothesis by examining
participants' behavioral outcomes (as measured by the decisions made in the RB
paradigm) following the written disclosure task. Consequently, based on these
hypotheses, I expected participants' performances in the decision-making task to be
consistent with the writing condition to which they were assigned. Thus, if participants
invoked their rational system through fact-based disclosure, they should have more
frequently chosen from the smaller tray that yielded an equal or greater chance of success
as compared to the larger tray. If, however, participants invoked their experiential system
through the emotion-based disclosure, they should have more frequently chosen from the
larger tray that yielded a lower chance of winning. No hypotheses were made for the
trauma-combination condition, in which participants wrote about the facts and emotions
surrounding a traumatic experience. Given that this was a combination condition, it was
included for comparison purposes to the conditions with one of each only. Additionally,
no behavioral hypotheses were made for the control condition, in which participants
described their campus bedroom. This also served as a control condition for writing.
I also hypothesized that the trauma-fact and trauma-emotion disclosure conditions
would result in differences in autonomic space. To examine the physiological outcomes
of disclosure, heart rate (HR), blood pressure (BP), pre-ejection period (PEP), and
respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) were recorded throughout the writing and decision
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making tasks as indicators of sympathetic and vagal activity. First, consistent with the
literature that associated emotional disclosure with increased cardiovascular reactivity
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 1995; Petronio, 2000), those in the trauma
emotion condition (i.e. experiential mode) were expected to display overall increases in
physiological arousal as compared to those in the trauma-fact and control conditions.
Second, based on the assertion that events involving high versus low brain functioning
involve different types of activation, I expected to see different patterns of autonomic
arousal between the two writing groups. I posited that those in the trauma-emotion
condition (i.e. experiential mode) would display autonomic patterns associated with
lower brain functioning, marked by an increase in sympathetic activity coupled with a
decrease in vagal activity. Conversely, I hypothesized that those in the trauma-fact
condition (Le. rational mode) would display autonomic patterns associated with higher
brain functioning, marked by diverse sympathetic and vagal activity. Such patterns
included an increase in sympathetic activity with no change in vagal activity and a
decrease in vagal activity with no change in sympathetic activity. The existence of such
patterns of autonomic reactivity between writing conditions would support the claim that
emotional and rational disclosure invoked the experiential and rational systems,
respectively.
Method
Participants
Sixty undergraduates were recruited as participants from an Introductory
Psychology course at Illinois Wesleyan University, a small, private, liberal arts
institution. Of these, 24 were male and 36 were female. Ages of the participants ranged
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from eighteen to twenty-two. Each received one research credit toward their general
psychology course requirements for participating.
Measures
Ratio-bias paradigm. Participants were presented with two rectangular,
transparent, plastic trays containing different mixtures of red and white jelly beans. The
large and a small trays were always presented together. The small tray contained a total
of 10 jelly beans, 1 of which was red (10% red). The large tray contained a total of 100
jellybeans, with the number of red jelly beans varying among trials from 7, 9, and 10,
(7%, 9%, and 10% red). The jellybeans were spread in a flat layer so that all were
visible. An index card stating the percentage of red jelly beans and the number of red and
white jelly beans was placed in front of each tray for each trial.
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). This 40-item inventory (Epstein, 1999)
was designed to measure rational and experiential thinking styles. Items on the scale
included questions such as, "I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about'
something," and "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions." Participants responded to
statements on a 5-point scale ranging from "Definitely false" to "Definitely true." As
individual differences may have been related to this construct, I included this measure as
a potential co-variate (see Appendix A for REI and REI scoring key).
Letter-circling task. Participants engaged in a letter-circling reaction time task
during which their cardiovascular measures, performance, and reaction time were
recorded. The objective of this task was to control for the confound of arousal. For
example, differences in arousal would predict impaired performance on complex tasks,
such as the ratio-bias task, and improved performance on simple tasks, such as the letter
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circling task (Zajonc, 1965). Participants were given a page of text and asked to circle
every letter "e" as quickly and accurately as possible (see Appendix B). Participants
were told that they would be timed, and their reaction time was recorded with a
stopwatch. This task emulated computer-based tasks that have repeatedly been used to
examine reaction time in response to simple stimuli. Uniformity of task performance
between participants during this task would suggest that any performance differences in
the ratio-bias task across the four writing conditions could not be accounted for by
arousal differences.
Physiological. ZCG, a non-invasive measure of blood flow through the heart, and
ECG, a measure of the electromechanical action of the heart, was obtained using a
Minnesota Impedance Cardiograph (model304B) employing the standard tetrapolar
aluminum/mylar tape electrode system. The electrodes were adhesive bands that
completely encircled the body. The second band was placed at the base of the neck; the
first band was placed at least 3 em above the second band; the third band was placed at
the level of the xiphisternal junction (or just below the bra line for female participants);
the fourth band was placed at least 3 cm below the third band. The front and back
distances between the inner edges of the second and third bands were recorded for use in
data reduction. The impedance signals of primary interest were Zo, a measure of basal
thoracic impedance, and dZ/dt, a measure of changes in thoracic impedance. ECG was
recorded using the standard lead II configuration with Ag/AgCI disposable electrodes
(Protrace 9113). Blood pressure, a measure of pressure within the arteries, was obtained
using a get from lab Monitor (model BP-508). Blood pressure was obtained from a self
inflating cuff.
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Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were infonned of the general nature
of the study and completed an infonned consent fonn (see Appendix C). Participants
were then seated in the recording chamber, and a blood pressure cuff and various
sensors/transducers were attached. Participants rested for up to one minute while the
physiological signals were checked and calibrated. Then, the first five-minute baseline
recording was obtained. The experimenter left the room during the baseline recording to
allow the participant to relax (see Appendix D for log sheet used to record pulse and
blood pressure).
After the 5-minute baseline recording, the experimenter returned to the recording
room. Participants were then given paper and a pencil and introduced to one of four
writing topics: trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, trauma-combination, and control (see
Appendix E, F, G & H for respective writing instructions). All sixty participants were
randomly and equally assigned to one of the four writing conditions, N=15. The
experimenter left the room again during the writing task to give the participant privacy.
The participants randomly assigned to the trauma-fact condition were told to discuss a
personally traumatic experience from a strictly factual perspective, (i.e. discuss when,
where, and what happened), without referring to their emotions at all. Those assigned to
the trauma-emotion writing condition were asked to focus on how they felt at the time of
the trauma and how they felt now, omitting any discussion of the facts surrounding the
experience. Those assigned to the trauma-combination condition were asked to write
about the facts and emotions surrounding a personally traumatic experience, focusing on
what happened, how they felt then, and how they felt about it now. The control condition
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was asked to write about their campus bedroom in detail, describing the furniture, colors,
and pictures in their room. Physiological reactivity was measured during the task.
After ten minutes of writing, the experimenter returned, and participants were
introduced to the ratio-bias task and the letter-circling task in counterbalanced order.
During the ratio-bias task, participants were told that they had the opportunity to win
money by drawing a red jelly bean from one of the trays (see Appendix I for
instructions). The net amount that could be won ($9) was placed on the table in full view
in play money, and this play money was exchanged for real money at the end of the
study. Participants were told that they could win $1 upon drawing a red jelly and would
neither win nor lose money upon drawing a white jellybean. Participants were given the
opportunity to select which tray they would draw for each trial.
The ratio-bias task consisted of nine trials. The first six trials varied by
percentage of red jelly beans in the large tray (7%, 9%, 10%). A Latin-square design was
used to vary the order of the trials. The last three trials were trials in which the large tray
contained either 40% or 50% red jelly beans, and the small tray contained either 50% or
40% red jelly beans, respectively. These trials were not included in the statistical
analyses and were included solely to increase the likelihood that all participants would
win some money.
For each trial, the experimenter presented the two labeled trays ofjelly beans and
read a script explaining the valence of each tray. The participant was then asked to
indicate the tray from which he or she wanted to draw (see Appendix J for RB recording
logs). Tray positions were altered on every trial to control for a position effect (i.e., right
or left). After the participant chose a tray, the experimenter placed a blindfold on the
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participant's eyes, mixed the jelly beans, and guided the participant's hand toward the
selected tray. Depending on the outcome of each trial, the participant was either paid
(won by drawing a red jelly bean) or had nothing happen (drew a white jelly bean).
Autonomic reactivity was measured throughout the entire task. Upon completion of the
ratio-bias task and the letter-circling task, the recording apparatus was removed, and the
participant completed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) and a demographics
form (see Appendix K for demographics form). Upon completion of the self-report
measures, participants underwent a verbal emotional assessment. An emotional
assessment was completed as part of the debriefing process to ensure that the participant
was not adversely affected as a result of the written disclosure (see Appendix L). If the
participant was emotionally stable, he/she was thanked and debriefed (see Appendix M).
The entire procedure took approximately 1 hour.
Results
Manipulation check
In order to examine whether effects were consistent with prior literature,
manipulation checks were included. First we examined whether heart rate (HR) and
mean arterial pressure (MAP) increased from the rest period to the writing period in a
way consistent with past research (Pennebaker & Beall, 1987; Pennebaker et aI., 1987). A
within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests indicated main effects, marked by
significant increases in heart rate, E (2, 53)=55.3, p < .05, and mean arterial pressure, E
(2,53)= 16.4, p < .05, from the last minute of rest to the first minute of writing. (Refer to
Table 2 for mean values). We did not find significant differences, however, in heart rate,
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E (6, 108)=.26,12> .1, and mean arterial pressure, E (6, 108)=.11,12 >.1, by writing
condition.
Manipulation checks also examined I) whether decisions made in the ratio-bias
(RB) task mirrored past trends, and 2) whether participants' scores on the Rational
Experiential Inventory (REI) predicted choices made in the ratio-bias (RB) task as found
previously. In examining the average number of optimal and nonoptimal choices made in
the RB task, our results replicated prior findings (Pacini & Epstein, 1999): Overall,
participants made more optimal (M=2.6, SD=l.I) as compared to nonoptimal (M=1.3,
SD=1.1) choices across the 6 RB trials, but did make nonoptimal choices. (Recall that
there were a total of 9 RB trials, yet the last 3 trials in which the valences of the small and
large tray varied between 50% and 40% were included only to increase the chances that
participants would win money; these 3 trials were not included in our statistical analyses.
Additionally, recall that for two of the six trials, valences in the two trays were equal, and
hence the decisions made did not reflect an optimal versus nonoptimal decision).
To examine the relationship between participants' scores on the REI and choices
made in the RB task, we conducted a median split to separate those classified as high vs.
low experiential/rational thinkers. Those participants with median scores were
eliminated from the sample, yielding N=46 scores remaining. A univariate ANOVA
indicated that optimal choices made by those low in total rationality (M=2.85, SD=I.2)
were not significantly different from those high in rationality (M=2.6, SD=I.l), F=.24, P
> .1. In addition, a univariate ANOVA revealed that those low in total experientiality
made optimal choices (M=2.7, SD=1.1) that were not significantly different from those
high in total experientiality, (M=2.8, SD=1.2), E=.04, 12 > .1. Thus, there were no
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significant differences in the number of optimal choices made between those classified as
high versus low experiential or rational thinkers 1. These results are inconsistent with past
research (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) that found a direct relationship between total
rationality scores on the REI and the number of optimal choices made on the RB
paradigm.
Finally, one potential confound in our study was participants' level of arousal. As
discussed above, differences in arousal would predict impaired performance on complex
tasks, such as the RB task, and improved performance on simple tasks, such as the lettercircling task (Zajonc, 1965). Thus, to control for this confound, we included a simple
reaction-time task in which participants' circled every letter "e" they found in a
paragraph of text. Participants' reaction time and performance on this letter-circling task
were measured and analyzed as an indicator of whether any physiological arousal from
the writing task might have also influenced decisions made in the RB task. To check for
differences in the effects of arousal by writing condition, one-way analyses of variance
were used to compare participants' accuracy and reaction time in performing the lettercircling task across the four writing conditions. Results indicated no significant
differences in the reaction time, E (3,56)=1.3, Q> .1, number of missed E's, E (3,56)=.01,
Q>

.1, or the number of non-E's circled, E (3,56)=.56, Q> .1, by writing condition.

Because the letter-circling task was counterbalanced with the ratio-bias task throughout
the study, we also examined reaction time and performance on the letter-circling task for
those participants who participated in the letter circling task immediately after writing (as
opposed to immediately following the RB task). This manipulation was included to

IWhen including the median scores in the high experiential/rational groups, the effects were the same. Mean number of
optimal choices = 2.8 (SD=I.22) & 2.7 (SD=1.15) for those who scored high and low in rationality, respectively.
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account for the possibility of the declining arousal effects of disclosure for those who
participated in the circling task immediately after disclosure. Again, results indicated no
difference in reaction time, E (3,26)=2.66, Q> .1, number of missed E's, E (3,26)=1.73, Q
> .1, and number ofnon-E's circled, E(3,26)=.06, Q> .1, by writing condition. These
results suggest that any performance differences in the RB task across the four writing
conditions were not accounted for by arousal differences.
Effects of writing conditions on the ratio-bias task
We first ran a frequency check to examine outliers; no outliers were found. The
mean number of optimal choices among each writing condition was the following:
trauma-fact M=2.4 (SD=1.2), trauma-emotion M=2.4 (SD=1.1), trauma-combination
M=2.6 (SD=I.2), control M=2.9 (SD=I.0). A one-way ANOVA found that these
differences were not significant, E (3,56)=.528, Q>.1. Because the order ofthe RB and
letter-circling task was counterbalanced throughout the study, we next filtered the data to
examine only those participants who participated in the RB task immediately following·
the writing task. A one-way ANOVA found no significant differences between the four
groups in this condition, E (3,26)=1.09, Q>.1.
As a follow-up, we examined contrasts comparing the number of optimal
decisions for each ofthe 3 trauma conditions (trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, and trauma
combination) to the 1 non-trauma (control) condition for all 6 trials of the RB task. A
Student's T-test indicated no significant differences between the trauma-fact and control
group, trauma-emotion and control group, or trauma-combination and control group, Q >
.1 in all cases. Next we examined the effect of writing on just the first trial of the RB
task. A Pearson chi-square test indicated significant differences in the frequency of types
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of choices made across the different writing conditions in trial 1 ofthe RB paradigm, x 2
(3, N=60}=14.4, Q < .05. More specifically, participants in the control condition made
the most optimal choices in trial 1 of the RB paradigm (11 optimal choices compared to 1
nonoptimal choice), followed by the trauma-combination condition (6 optimal choices
compared to 1 nonoptimal choice), the trauma-emotion condition (5 optimal choices
compared to 6 nonoptimal choices) and the trauma-fact condition (4 optimal choices
compared to 6 nonoptimal choices). (Refer to Table 3 for mean scores). Inspection of
these frequencies revealed 91 % and 85% optimal choices made by the control and
trauma-combination conditions (respectively) in trial I, as compared to 41 %, and 40%
optimal choices made by the trauma-emotion and trauma-fact conditions, respectively.
Thus, these results suggest that those in the trauma-combination and control conditions
may have been processing in the rational mode, whereas those in the trauma-emotion and
trauma-fact conditions may have been processing in the experiential mode. Given that
the effects were not significant across all 6 trials, these results also suggest that the
cognitive effects of the writing task may be short-lived.
The above analyses, however, did not filter the equal optimality trials (trials in
which the probability of drawing a red jelly bean was equal in the two trays) from the
optimal and nonoptimal trials. Therefore, as a follow-up analysis to ensure that the
overall effect was not somehow due to the equal valence trials, we repeated the chi
square test after filtering out any trials in which the trays contained equal percentages of
red jelly beans. Again, results indicated significant differences in the frequencies of
types of choices made by participants in different writing conditions in trial 1 of the RB
task, x 2 (3, N = 40) = 9.6, Q < .05. These significant differences were also replicated
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when examining the number of optimal choices on trial 1 of the RB task only for those
who participated in the RB task immediately after writing, x 2 (6, N=30) = 10.5, II < .05.
Effects of writing condition on autonomic activation
As discussed above, autonomic space is measured by respiratory sinus arrhythmia
(RSA) and pre-ejection period (PEP). RSA is an indication of parasympathetic activity;
as RSA increases, parasympathetic control of the heart increases. PEP is an indication of
sympathetic activity; as PEP decreases, sympathetic control of the heart increases.
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the effects of writing condition on
autonomic activation. Specifically, we examined the correlation between the change in
RSA and the change in PEP from the last minute of the rest period to the first minute of
writing. The greater the correlation between these two variables, the greater the coupling
ofthe sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous system. (For
all tests with rejection criteria set at II < .05, only the correlation for the trauma
combination condition was significant). (Refer to Figures 1-4 for scatter graphs
indicating degree of sympathetic and parasympathetic coupling by writing condition).
Inspection of autonomic coupling revealed a relatively small correlation between
the change in RSA and the change in PEP during the first minute of writing for those in
the trauma-fact condition, r=.28, n.s. This indicated relatively weak coupling ofthe
sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic system for those in this
writing condition. Those in the trauma-emotion writing condition, however,
demonstrated a relatively strong positive correlation between the change in RSA and PEP
from the last minute of rest to the first minute of writing, r=.50, II < .05. Combined,
these findings lend partial support for our hypotheses. They suggest more coupling of the
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autonomic system during the first minute of writing for those in the trauma-emotion
condition ([=.50) as compared to the trauma-fact condition ([=.28). The degree of
coupling between the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions was weak: in the first
minute of writing for those in the trauma-combination group, [=.05, n.s. Moreover,
similar to the trauma-fact and trauma-combination conditions, coupling of the
sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions was also weak: in the control condition, [=.18,
n.s. Again, these results indicate less coupling of the autonomic nervous system in the
first minute of writing for the control condition ([=.18) as compared to the trauma
emotion condition ([=.50).
Discussion
The results of this experiment should be viewed as promising rather than
definitive. Results replicated past findings demonstrating increases in heart rate and
mean arterial pressure during disclosure. Results were inconsistent, however, with past
studies that suggested a relationship between scores on the REI and performance in the
RB task. Across the four writing conditions, we found limited differences in
physiological reactivity (as measured by autonomic activation) and behavioral outcomes
(as measured by choices made in the ratio-bias paradigm). This suggests that if the
writing tasks evoked differential thinking, the effect was small. Consistent with our
hypotheses, participants in the trauma-emotion condition displayed significantly greater
coupling of the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic system as
compared to the other writing conditions. Thus, to the extent that differences in
autonomic coupling reflect control of different parts of the brain, writing about the
emotions surrounding a traumatic event may indeed have primed a different mode of
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cognitive processing than the other tasks. The results of the RB task did not confirm our
hypotheses that participants in the trauma-emotion condition would make fewer optimal
choices than those in the trauma-fact condition. Instead, differences by writing condition
in the RB choices were evident only during trial I of the RB task, with those in the
control condition along with those in the trauma-combination condition making
proportionally more optimal choices relative to those in the trauma-emotion and trauma
fact groups. The results of all the RB trials combined did not indicate significant
differences by writing condition.
While the pattern displayed in the RB paradigm did not support our hypotheses,
these findings nonetheless hold important implications in understanding the cognitive
effects of written disclosure. That is, the trauma writing condition that resulted in the
most optimal choices in the RB task was the condition that integrated both rational and
emotional disclosure (trauma-combination group). These results highlight the possible
importance of cognitive integration in predicting rationality. One can speculate that this .
means that combined emotional and factual disclosure as compared to just emotional or
factual disclosure allows one (at least in the short-run) to place the traumatic event in the
most rational light. Moreover, recall that the rational system encodes information in the
form of abstract representations (as opposed to concrete representations). Thus, these
results suggest that thinking about both the facts and emotions surrounding personal
trauma may result in more abstract thinking about the event, leading to the highest level
of rational thinking. Thus, the increased proportion of optimal choices displayed by
those in the trauma-combination condition in trial I (as compared to the trauma-fact and
trauma-emotion conditions) may be due to the abstract thinking or to the cognitive
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integration of the rational and experiential modes that occurred during disclosure.
Moreover, that differences across the writing conditions were only evident in trial 1 of
the RB task may suggest that the effects of disclosure were short-lived. In other words,
the mode of thinking that was conjured through written disclosure may have lasted just
long enough to influence the first trial of the RB task. After the first trial, participants
may have become engrossed in the game, thus overriding any cognitive effects that the
writing task may have conjured. How long these effects were maintained during the
writing task is open to future research.
Although potentially revealing, the results must be tentatively interpreted. First,
the total number of participants in the study (N=60) and the total number of participants
in each writing condition (N=15) were relatively small compared to prior RB studies.
Furthermore, participants were not selected in any way for having a debilitating
undisclosed trauma; therefore, it was impossible to evaluate whether or not participants
were able to write about the given topic. Additionally, participants' writings had not yet
been coded at the time ofthe analyses. Therefore, we were unaware ofthe participants'
levels of disclosure (i.e., high or low) and whether they had disclosed according to the
directions given (i.e. disclosing solely the facts or emotions surrounding a traumatic
event). Consequently, if participants did not write according to the directions given, the
possibility of evoking a particular mode of thinking would not be possible. Lastly, lack
oftime limited the extent and depth of our analyses. It is possible that more trends may
appear in the physiological and ratio-bias data after further analyses.
Our results hold a great deal of promise for future research. As demonstrated in
earlier studies (Pennebaker, 1995; Pennebaker & Beall, 1987), our results replicate the
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finding that written disclosure evokes cardiovascular reactivity. Moreover, our results
hold future promise for revising the ratio-bias task in attempts to prevent the diminishing
effect of writing past the first trial. To do this, we may substitute a pair-wise preference
task in place of the RB task, in which pictures ofthe small and large jelly bean trays
flash on a computer screen for 2.5 seconds for 45 trials, thereby allowing us to examine
more trials of the RB task during a shorter period oftime. Participants will have 2.5
seconds to select a tray, thus causing quicker judgments and increased potential for
variability (by increasing the number of trials in the task from 6 to 45). These changes
may prevent the participant's ability to "regroup," as may have happened in this study,
and may allow them to remain in the cognitive mode evoked by the writing task. Future
endeavors should also examine gender differences in the RB task. Moreover, a close
examination of CEST is suggested, as some skepticism has been cast on the idea that the
rational system is an evolutionarily newer system that dates back only 5,000 years.
These modifications will yield more comprehensive findings relating to the
effects of written disclosure upon behavioral outcomes. The ultimate resolution of these
issues should have direct bearing on our understanding of the cognitive and physiological
underpinnings of written disclosure. In sum, the results reveal tentative support for the
idea that different types of written disclosure may invoke different cognitive and
physiological processes.
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Table I
A Comparison of the Experiential and Rational Systems (Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1998)
Experiential
1. Holistic
2. Automatic, effortless
3. Affective: pleasure-pain oriented (what
feels good)
4. Associationistic connections
5. Behavior mediated by ''vibes'' from past
events
6. Encodes reality in concrete images,
metaphors, and narratives
7. More rapid processing: oriented toward
immediate action
8. Slower and more resistant to change
9. More crudely differentiated
10. More crudely integrated-dissociative,
emotional complexes; context-specific
processing
11. Experienced passively and
preconsciously; we believe we are seized
by our emotions
12. Self-evidently valid: "Experiencing is
believing"

Rational
1. Analytic
2. Intentional, effortful
3. Logical: Reason oriented (what is
sensible)
4. Logical connections
5. Behavior mediated by conscious
appraisal of events
6. Encodes reality in abstract symbols,
words, and numbers
7. Slower processing: capacity for longdelayed action
8. Changes more rapidly and easily
9. More highly differentiated
10. More highly integrated; contextgeneral principles
11. Experienced actively and consciously;
we believe we are in control of our
conscious thoughts
12. Requires justification via logic and
evidence
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Table 2
Mean Heart Rate (HR) and Mean Arterial Pressure (MAP) During Last Minute of Rest
and First Minute of Writing Across the Four Writing Conditions

Writing Condition
Physiological
Reactivity

Trauma-fact

Trauma-emotion Trauma-combination Control

HR-rest

74.6 (SD=10.6)

71.1 (SD=12.4)

70.5 (SD=II.4)

73.7 (SD=9.7)

HR-writing

79.3 (SD=12.6)

78.4 (SD=13.9)

78.1 (SD=12.2)

80.2 (SD=9.7)

MAP-rest

87.0 (SD=7.5)

85.4 (SD=8.1)

87.3 (SD=10.8)

86.3 (SD=6.9)

MAP-writing.

90.1 (SD=9.6)

92.7 (SD=II.4)

91.9 (SD=8.9)

89.6 (SD=7.1)
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Table 3
Number of Optimal and Nonoptimal Choices Made in Trial 1 ofthe Ratio-Bias Task by
Writing Condition

Choice in trial 1
Writing Condition

Optimal

Nonoptimal

Trauma-fact

4 (6.5)

6 (3.5)

Trauma-emotion

5 (7.2)

6 (3.9)

Trauma-combination

6 (4.6)

1 (2.4)

Control

11 (7.8)

1 (4.2)

Note. The values in parentheses represent the expected values.

43

•

CI

c

i.9

".0
-3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0

Ratioaal and Emotivo Disclosure

*

0

a

.5

-e
-e

0.0
-.5
II)
-1.0
E -1.5
-2.0
CD
OJ -2.5
c
CO
"fi -3.0
CO -3.5
".0
40

0

0

a
a

0

8

e

o

", -10

-20

-30

B

20

10

pep change from rest to writing'
Figure 1
-Autonomic SPace as a Function of Cbange in Pre-ELection Period CPEPl and CbanG in Respiratory Sinus
Arrhythmia (RSAl for Particjpants in the Trauma-Fact COnditi9n

.
3
o

2

a
c .:1

Q

;I

°i

....9

0

a

•

'

II)

e

E

a
a

0

-1

B

0~

CD

-2

a
c

as

1i
as

e

a

-3

..

-to

,

-30

-20

-10

o

10

.20

" pep 'chan~e frof!1 rest to writing
Figuro2

Autonomic
Period crEp) and Cbange in JSPlT80rv
R ' t S·lOPS "
. SPace
, " as a function 9fCbange
. " . in
. Pre-Ejection
.
Arrhythmia CRSAl f9['Partfc jpanu In tho Trauma-Emotion Conditf~n

•
-.


Rational and Emotive Disclosure

4S

3
2

ga
:o::l

"i

1

.9

o



en

a
D
D

!

E

D

D

-1

,g

D
D

.

D

-2

CD

0)

D
D

c:

CU

"5

-3

CU

D

~

-4
-40 -36 -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -a -4
-38 -34 -30 -26 -22 -18 -14 -10 -6 -2

.

4

.

8

2

6

12
10

14

16 20
18

pep change from rest to writing
Figure 3
Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (PEP) and Change in Respiratory Sinus
Arrhythmia CRSA) for Participants in the Trauma-eombination Condition

-- ----------- - ---

---------

4.0
3.5
3.0

2.5

a
c:

j

.9

.en

e

..)

2.0
1.5
1.0

.5
0.0
-.5
-1.0

CD

"6cu
a:J
~

"

a
D

D

Q

D

Q

Q

,gE -1.5
ga

D

D

D

D

D

-2.0
-2.5
-3.0
-3.5
-4.0
-40

-30

-20

-10

o

10

20

pep ~_ange from rest to writing
Figure 4

Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (pEP) and Change in Respiratory Sinus
Arrhythmia CRSA) for Participants in the Control Condition

}

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

46

References
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Quigley, K.S. (1991). Autonomic detenninism: The
modes of autonomic control, the doctrine of autonomic space, and the laws of
autonomic constraint. Psychological Review, 98, 459-487.
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Quigley, K. S. (1993). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia:
Autonomic origins, physiological mechanisms, and psychophysiological
implications. Psychophysiology, 30, 183-196.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited, or a theory of a theory. American
Psychologist. 28, 404-416.
Epstein, S. (1991). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In M. R. Gunnor & A. L. Sroufe
(Eds.), Self processes and Development (pp. 211-238). Hillsdale, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Epstein, S. (1993c). Implications of cognitive-experiential self-theory for personality
and developmental psychology. In D. Funder, R. Parke, C. Tomlinson-Keasy, &'

K. Widamen (Eds.), Studying lives through time: Personality and development
(pp.399-438). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious.
American Psychologist, 8, 709-724.
Epstein, S. (1998). Cognitive-experiential self-theory: A dual-process personality theory
with implications for diagnosis and psychotherapy. In R. F. Bornstein & J. M.
Masling (Eds.), Empirical perspectives on the psychoanalytic theories (pp. 99
141). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

47

Epstein, S. (1998). Cognitive-experiential self-theory: Implications for developmental
psychology. In D. F. Barone & M. Herson (Eds.), Advanced Personality, The
Plenum Series in Social/Clinical Psychology (pp. 79-122). New York: Plenum.
Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein,

c., & Huh, E.

(1992). Irrational reactions to negative

outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 62,813-825.
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 390-405.
Gross, J. (1989). Emotional expression in cancer onset and progression. Social Science
and Medicine, 28, 1239-1248.
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory and
subjective probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 534-544.
Levy, S, M., Herberman, R. B., Maluish, A. M., Schlien, B., & Lippman, M. (1985).
Prognostic risk assessment in primary breast cancer by behavioral and
immunological parameters. Health Psychology, 4, 99-113.
Magee, V. L. (1999). Making up her own mind: A psychological study of the role of
personal writing in adolescent girls' development. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Harvard University.
Miller, D. T., & Gunasegaram, S. (1990). Temporal order and the perceived mutability
of events: Implications for blame assignment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 59, 1111-1118.

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

48

Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential infonnation
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972-987.
Pennebaker, J. W. (1995). Emotion, Disclosure, & Health. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Pennebaker, J. W., & Beall, S. K. (1986). Confronting a traumatic event: Toward an
understanding of inhibition and disease. Journal of Abnonnal Psychology, 95,
274-281.
Pennebaker, J. W., & Hoover, C. W. (1986). Inhibition and cognition: Toward and
understanding of trauma and disease. In RJ. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, & D.
Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation (Vol. 4, pp. 107-136). New
York: Plenum Press.
Pennebaker, J. W., Hughes, C. F., & O'Heeron, R. C. (1987). The psychophysiology of
confession: Linking inhibitory and psychosomatic processes. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 781-793.
Petronio, S. (2000). Balancing the Secrets of Private Disclosures. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Richards, J. M. & Gross, J. (1999). Composure at any cost? The cognitive
consequences of emotion suppression. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 1033-1044.
Sherwood, A. (1993). Use of Impedance Cardiography in Cardiovascular Research. In
J. Blascovich & E. Katin (Eds.), Cardiovascular reactivity to psychological stress

•
Rational and Emotive Disclosure

49

and disease, pp. 157-201. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association.
Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kelsey, R. M., & Leitten, C. (1993). Subjective,
physiological, and behavioral effects of threat and challenge appraisals. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 248-260.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning. The
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. Science, 149,269-274.

Rational and Emotive Disclosure

50

Appendix A

REI

Participant #_ _

Please circle the corresponding number as you rate the following statements about your feelings,
beliefs, and behaviors. Work rapidly; fIrst impressions are as good as any.
1
Definitely
False

2
Mostly
False

3
Undecided
or Equally
True and
False

4
Mostly
True

5
Definitely
True

1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems.

1

2

3

4

5

2. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make
mistakes.

1

2

3

4

5

3. I prefer complex to simple problems.

1

2

3

4

5

4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me
make decisions.

1

2

3

4

5

5. I have no problem in thinking things through clearly.

1

2

3

4

5

6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on
my gut feelings.

1

2

3

4

5

7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.

1

2

3

4

5

8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.

1

2

3

4

5

9. I am not a very analytical thinker.

1

2

3

4

5

10. I believe in trusting my hunches.

1

2

3

4

5

11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described
himself or herself as intuitive.

1

2

3

4

5

17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out
problems in my life.

1

2

3

4

5

,

.)

12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based
on feelings.
13. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they
are accurate.
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my
decisions.
15. Knowing the answer without having to understand the
reasoning behind it is good enough for me.
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18. I enjoy intellectual challenges.

1

2

3

4

5

19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong,
even if I can't explain how I know.

1

2

3

4

5

20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course
of action.

1

2

3

4

5

21. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most
people's.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

25. I trust my initial feelings about people.

1

2

3

4

5

26. I have a logical mind.

1

2

3

4

5

27. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition
for important decisions.

1

2

3

4

5

28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.

1

2

3

4

5

29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.

1

2

3

4

5

30. I am not very good in solving problems that require
careful logical analysis.

1

2

3

4

5

31. I think there are times wheft one should rely on one's
intuition.

1

2

3

4

5

32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.

1

2

3

4

5

33. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in
figuring out problems in my life.

1

2

3

4

5

34. I don't reason well under pressure.

1

2

3

4

5

35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.

1

2

3

4

5

36. Thinking hard and for a long time about something
gives me little satisfaction.

1

2

3

4

5

37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest
"gut feelings" to fmd an answer.

1

2

3

4

5

38. I am much better at figuring things out logically than
most people.

1

2

3

4

5

39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.

1

2

3

4

5

22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong
points~

23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on
intuition.
124. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth
.
about something.

•

140. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing

Rational and Emotive Disclosure
1

2

3

4

52
5

to me.
Note. From "The Relation of Rational and Expenentlal Information Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs,
and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon," by Rosemary Pacini and Seymour Epstein, 1999, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76, p. 976. Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
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REI Scoring Key
Scoring: Sum of ratings (1-5) of items in a scale. Item numbers with an ''T'' are reverse scored as
follows: 1 = 5, 2 = 4, 3 = 3, 4 = 2, 5 = 1.
Rational Ability
1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
5. I have no problem in thinking things through clearly.
r9. I am not a very analytical thinker.
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
r22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
26. I have a logical mind.
30. I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
r34. I don't reason well under pressure.
38. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
Rational Favorability
3. I prefer complex to simple problems.
r7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
rl5. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough
forme.
18. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
r24. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
r28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.
32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
r36. Thinking hard anq for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
40. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
Total Rationality = Sum of Rational Ability & Rational Engagement

Experiential Ability
r2. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
10. I believe in trusting my hunches.
rl3. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if! can't explain how I know.
r2I. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's.
25. I trust my initial feelings about people.
r29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.
33. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.

•
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Experiential Favorability
r4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
r12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
r 16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.
20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
r23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
r27. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions.
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition.
35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
Total Experientiality = Sum Experiential Ability & Experiential Engagement
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Appendix B
Participant #_ _

Wine cork takes the fonn of a suberose tissue, composed of
an arrangement of parenchymatous cells originating from a
secondary meristem: phellogen. All trees produce cells of the cork
type, but it is only the Quercus Suber that produces a protective
layer that achieves considerable thickness (which is harvested and
regenerates) with characteristics that make it commercially
profitable. Not only does the cork oak bear the distinction of
producing suberose tissues, it is also, due to its long lifespan (150
to 200 years), certainly the only tree to show a conspicuous
production

of~suberin,

with an excellent capacity for regeneration

and a protective tissue characterized by extraordinary physio
mechanical and chemical properties.
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Appendix C
Informed Consent

Weare requesting that you participate in a research study being conducted by Leila
Setork, an undergraduate psychology student here at lllinois Wesleyan University under the
supervision of Dr. John Ernst. At the end of this fonn you will be asked to initial two paragraphs
to ensure that you have carefully read them. The purpose of this project is to better understand
the cognitive and physiological processes underlying written disclosure. In order to do this, we
are fIrst going to ask you to write about a personal event for ten minutes. You may be asked to
write about something traumatic or something not traumatic. While you write, you will be
hooked up to sensors and a blood pressure cuff. This equipment will be used to collect your
physiological responses (such as heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) throughout the study.

In order to measure your heart function, two adhesive bands, like long Band-Aids, will be
placed around your neck and two around your abdomen. This will require that you raise your
shirt slightly so we can place the lower bands around your stomach. These bands will be placed
on you by a female research assistant. In addition, a very few individuals report that the bands
leave a slight reddening of the skin. Although this causes no discomfort, the marks sometimes
take up to 24 hours to completely fade.

---- initials
You may then be asked to write about a personally traumatic experience for ten minutes.

----initials
Afterwards,.you will be asked to participate in a decision-making task and a visual
performance task. Lastly, you will be completing a total of four surveys and a brief
demographics questionnaire (questions about your age, year in school, etc.), which will take
approximately 15 minutes. The questions we ask you are about your beliefs and thinking styles.
You may fInd some of the questions to be personal or they may ask you about feelings that you
are not comfortable with. You are free to withdraw from the session at any time and are free to
answer or to not answer any of the questions. There will be no penalty or loss of credit for
withdrawing or for omission of answers. The entire procedure will last about an hour.
The specifIc information that you provide will be strictly confidential. Your
questionnaires and writing samples will be identified by a random numbered code, and your name
will not appear on any of the materials. Your responses will be classifIed and stored by a
participant ill number only. All information will be held under lock and key. Your writing
samples may be viewed only by members of the research team, and your identity will remain
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anonymous at all times. Under no circumstances will your writing sample or your responses to

the questionnaires be matched with your name. The anonymous responses that you provide will
be used by the members of the research team to better understand the people's experiences.
Summaries of information you and others participating in the study provide may appear in
research publications about psychology.
If you have any questions regarding this project, please feel free to contact Leila Setork at
(309) 556-3213 or the supervising faculty member, Dr. John M. Ernst at (309) 556- 3907. If you
have any concerns regarding this project, please feel free to contact Dr. Catherine Scherck, a
member of IWU's independent review board for ethics in experimentation, at (309) 556-3271.

I have read the above information pertaining to the cognitive and physiological processes
underlying disclosure.
_ _ I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I may stop participation at any time
or to not answer any of the questions without penalty.
I do not agree to participate in this research.

Participant Name (print)

Date

Participant Signature
.)

Date

Interviewer Signature

'-----
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Participant Log
Participant ID#- - - - - - Date- - - - - - Time- - - - Participant Gender
Experimenter

_
_

Writing Condition.
Task order: 1)

_
2)

Measurements (between tape 2 and 3): Front

cm

Back

BP Readings: Push "start" at the time indicated in the parentheses.
Rest task (Block 1):

Reading 1 (30 sec.)
Reading 2 (2 1/2 min.)_ _
Reading 3 (4 min.)

Writing (Block 2):

Reading 1 (1 min.)
Reading 2 (3 min).
Reading 3 (5 min.)
Reading 4 (7 min.)
Reading 5 (9 min.)

Letter-circling task:

Notes:

seconds

Cffi
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Appendix E

Writing Instructions for Trauma-Fact Condition
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987)
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or
traumatic experience of your entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss the details of the event. You
can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should be something
that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about something you have not
talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you do not mention your
feelings toward the experience. Instead, focus only upon the facts of the experience. Let
yourself go and retell the event as clearly as possible. In other words, write about what
happened, where it happened, and when it happened without referring to your emotions.
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Appendix F

Writing Instructions for Trauma-Emotion Condition
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987)
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or
traumatic experience of your entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss your deepest feelings about the
experience. You can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should
be something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about something
you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you do not
mention the trauma itself. Instead, focus only upon your emotions. Let yourself go and
touch the deepest emotions you have. In other words, write about how you felt at the
time of the event and how you feel about it now.
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AppendixG

Writing Instructions for Trauma-Combination Condition
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987)
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or
traumatic experience of your entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss your deepest thoughts and
feelings about the experience. You can write about anything you want. But whatever
you choose, it should be something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should
be about something you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical,
however, that you let yourself go and touch those deepest emotions and thoughts that you
have. In other words, write about what happened and how you felt about it, and how you
feel about it now.

.>

•
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AppendixH
Writing Instructions for Control Condition

I am now going to give you a pen and pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about your campus bedroom.
Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or sentence structure. In your writing, I want you
to clearly describe what your bedroom looks like at school. It may be your dorm room,
an apartment bedroom, or your bedroom in a fraternity or sorority house. Describe what
your bedroom looks like using the most detail possible. You can describe the furniture
you have, the colors of the room, posters on the wall, and any other descriptive features
of your bedroom.
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Appendix I
Instructions for RB task

You will now participate in a decision-making task in which you will have the
opportunity to win and keep real money. As you can see, there are two trays in front of
you filled with jellybeans. You'll notice that there are currently _ _ red jellybeans in
the small tray and
red jellybeans in the large tray, as indicated by the index cards.
So currently, the small tray contains __% red jellybeans, and the large tray contains
% red jellybeans.
- - You will have nine trials to draw a red jellybean from either one of the trays. For
each trial, I will be varying the percentage of red jellybeans in the two trays. If you draw
a red jellybean, you will win $1, which will be exchanged for real money at the end of the
study. If you draw a white jellybean, nothing happens, and you neither win nor lose
money. For each trial, you have the opportunity to select which tray you want to draw
from. Once you select a tray, I will cover your eyes, and you will draw one jellybean..
Do you have any questions?
For the first trial, you'll notice that the small tray contains __% red jellybeans, and the
large tray contains __% red jellybeans. Which tray would you like to draw from for
trial I?
Participant selects a tray, your partner covers the participant's eyes, you mix up the
jellybeans, you guide the participant's hand to the tray, and they draw a jellybean.
If red-~ give them a dollar.
If white-~ say "I'm sorry, it's white. You neither win nor lose money."
Then go to the nexi trial. Look on your sheet to see what the appropriate percentages are.
Add/remove jellybeans, and put the appropriate notecards in front of the trays. Don't
forget to switch the position ofthe trays for each trial!! Read them the percentages
again, and ask them to draw. Do this for all 9 trials.
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Appendix J
Participant #

RB Recording Sheet
% Jellybeans in

Trial

Large/Small tray
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.>

Participant's Choice

Win or lose

_
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_

Demographics

I. Age (in years):
3. Year in school: I

_
2

3 4

2. Gender: M

F (please circle one)

5 (please circle one)~

4. Major

_

5.. What is your ethnjcity?(please circle all that-apply)
a. Caucasion
b. Atiican-Amencan
c. Asian-American
d. Asian-Indian-American
e. Pacific Islander
f Asian-Indian ~ .
g. LatinolLatina
h. Asian
1. Native American
J. International Student
country of origin
k. Other

..

6. What social groups do you belong to on campus (please circle all that apply)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

volunteer organization
church group
academic club
fraternity or sorority
musical group
f.. varsity sports team
.)

7. How often, if at all, do you engage in personal writing (whether it be in a

. journal/diary, writing poetry. writing poetry/stories outside of class, etc.).
a. Once or more a week
b. A couple of times a month
c. A few times a year
d. Never
e. Other
_

. ;
'.

---

•
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For this study personal writing i3 defined 83 any type or writing that you do because it is a way to ref1«t
on your lire. For thi, study we are not including wo"' that you've done ror schooling.
1. Would you define personal writing in another way than my definition?
Yes
l
No
2

..

2. If you would define .personal writing in another way, what is your definition of personal writing?
J.

At some time in your life have you ever done personal writing - any type of writing that you do as a way to
reflect on your life?

Yes
No

1 [fyes, answer questions # 4-7.
2 If no, why you have NEVER do~e personal writing at any ~ime in your life.

4. Have you ever kept a diary or a diary?
Yes....... I

No ........ 2

5. There are many reasons for personal writing. Which of these reasons fit you. Please circle the number
corresponding to the statemept ~n the left side of the column. Circle all that apply.
To document, explore, escape from, or reflect on extremely painful memories
or feelin~s and how separate you feel from these feelin~s, includin~ an~er

1

To record daily events, hold onto writing for a lifetime, and to write innocent
stories

2

To access the self - to have a place where I can think about things related to
me

J

To reflect on social chan~e or social justice

4

To provide tem~'Gl y relieti'ventilation of daily stress/smaller issues (7.5%)

5

To telJ the truth

6

To break the isolation of feeling alone

7

To give myself a boos

S

To hide secret acts. feelin~s and thou~ts in the writin~

9

To complete creative writin2 or freewritin~ at school

10

To communicate with or write about God

] ]

To reflect or solve problems with friends or relationships

12

To share thoughtslfeelin~s1daily life with others in letters or gifts

13

Other reasons: please list the other reasons.

14

6. Which of the above reasons is your main reason for doing personal writing?
7. Please let us know anything else related to your personal writing.

_

6b
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Appendix L
Verbal Debriefmg

[Note to experimenter-ifat anytime you fiel /ike you want help-immediately
call Dr. Ernst (X-3907 or 820-1099). Ifhe cannot be reached then call the
health services at X-3 107.]
Thank you very much for participating in this study. Your participation will help us to
better understand the physiological and cognitive processes underlying disclosure. I will
be giving you a debriefing form before you leave that will further explain what this study
.
..
IS eXamlmng.
Right now, however, I want to specifically thank you for agreeing to write
about a personal experience. As previously mentioned, everything you have written will
remain confidential and anonymous. Often times if we write about something upsetting,
we may experience feelings of sadness, anger, or pain, or we may experience new
feelings that we had not previously experienced.
(1) Did the writing exercise conjure up feelings for you?
[Regardless ofwhether they say yes or no the experimenter is to move on to
the next question.]
(2) Is there anything you would like to talk about?
[Ifthe answer is yes-then the experimenter is to listen to what the
participant has to MY.]
What ifthe participant doesn't seem hysterical:
A. let the participant talk.
B. At the end say something like, "Thanks for sharing those feelings with
me. Your participation is really appreciated and as I mentioned above,
very valuable for understanding the repercussions of traumatic events." Go
to (3) below.
Imagine that the subject seems upset:
A. let the participant talk. At the end say something like, "You seem upset
to me. Would you like to have a chance to talk with my supervisor, Dr.
John Ernst, or someone at the health services? If they say yes, then
contact Ernst (X-3907 or 820-1099) or health services (X-3107). If they
ask for Ernst and he is not available call health services. If they don't
answer and the participant seems truly hysterical and/or suicidal (we
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don't anticipate suicidal ideation-indeed the literature suggests that disclosing
a traumatic event is likely to make the participant feel better) then call
the PATH Crisis Center @ 827-4005. If they say no, ask them if they want
you to call a friend to come pick them up.
(3) Is there someone you can talk to about this experience if you want to do
so later on?

If they say no-then refer them to the contact numbers for Dr. Ernst and the
Health Services Center.
(4) If at any time upon leaving should you want to talk to someone about any
feelings that this study may have evoked, please feel free to contact
Dr. John Ernst, social psychologist at Illinois Wesleyan University, or
IWU Counseling Services, located in the basement of Magill Hall. The
numbers for both places are on the debriefing form I am about to give you. Thank you
again for your participation.
[After reading the debriefingform the participant will be asked if they
have any further questions, thankedfor their participation, and dismissed.}
**Don 'tforget to give the participant their debriefingform and informed consentform
before they leave..

.>
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Appendix M

Debriefmg
Thank you very much for your participation! The main purpose of this study was to
examine the events surrounding written disclosure of traumatic experiences. Research conducted
by Epstein suggests the existence of two distinct modes of processing: rational and experiential.
The rational mode of processing is driven by logic and deliberative thought involving higher
brain functioning, whereas the experiential mode of processing is driven by emotions and
automatic heuristics involving lower brain functioning. For example, solving math problems
would more heavily invoke the rational system, whereas painting a picture would more heavily
rely upon the experiential system. It is possible that writing about the facts surrounding a
traumatic event invokes rational processing, whereas writing about the emotions surrounding a
traumatic event invokes experiential processing. We will be examining this possibility by
observing the relationship between your writing sample and the decisions you made in the jelly
bean and visual performance tasks.

In addition to self-report and behavioral measures, people's physiological responses have
often been examined as a way to learn more about their psychological processing. Berntson and
Cacioppo propose that events involving high brain functioning involve one type of autonomic
activation whereas lower brain functioning involves another. We will examine this hypothesis by
looking at your physiological reactivity throughout the study.
This research is valuable because it will help us better understand the cognitive and
physiological processes underlying disclosure. Disclosure is a central aspect in many therapies
and every day encounters. It is our hope that our research will shed some light on the hidden
processes that accompany emotional versus factual disclosure.
It is very important that you not talk about the specifics of this study with other students
at IWU. You are doing this study with lots of students and it's important that everyone comes '
with the same infonnation. We don't want some students and not others to know about specific
tasks or questions. However, you can say that you participated in a study that examined the
cognitive and physiological processes underlying disclosure.
If you have questions in the future, please contact John Ernst, Ph.D. at (309) 556-3907.
In addition, if you would like to discuss any feelings that this study may have invoked, please
contact Dr. Ernst or the counseling services at IWU (free services): (309)-556-3052.
If you are interested in this study and would like further information, the following is
recommended reading used in this study:
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing
styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 76, 972-987.
Pennebaker, J. W. Emotion, Disclosure, & Health. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Thanks again for your participation! Your help is of great service as we explore the
cognitive and physiological processes underlying disclosure.

